Poker
Four men arrested over unauthorized poker tournament, a first in Japan
Four men have been arrested on suspicion of organizing a poker tournament in Kobe without permission from the authorities. The Hyogo Prefectural Police have arrested four men, including a company executive, on suspicion of holding a poker tournament at a rented venue without the required permit, police said Wednesday. All four have partially denied the allegations, reportedly saying they did not think a permit was necessary. According to police, this is the first case in Japan in which organizers of a poker tournament have been arrested on suspicion of violating the Entertainment Business Act. Businesses that organize poker games are required to obtain permission from the prefectural public safety commission. Even tournaments held at rented venues can be in violation of the law if they run for two or more consecutive days and are deemed commercial operations, such as when entry fees are collected, police said.
Hacker may have stolen millions in a malware attack against online poker players
Wired has the story of a superuser cheating scandal. Professional poker is the latest community to reckon with the impact of a high-profile cyberattack. Cases where a player manages to cheat by getting unfair access to another person's cards is known as the superuser strategy, and it has popped up from time to time in the poker scene over the years. This most recent attack appears to have been a long-term campaign that may have seen millions of dollars stolen from across major online poker platforms. The story claims that the hacker exploited third-party tools allowing people to run multiple poker games at once to install a malware program called MeshAgent on specific players' computers.
Equilibrium Refinement for the Age of Machines: The One-Sided Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium
In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.
Equilibrium Refinement for the Age of Machines: The One-Sided Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium
In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.